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Given, Taken, Performed: Gender in a Tamil Theopoetics 
Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad 
There are many challenges to doing philosophy of gender through historical materials. 
Feminist sensibilities––in whatever manner we interpret them––are a mark of recent 
modernity, and we would be misguided if we sought to find them in any self-
conscious way in premodern texts. This presents a particularly acute problem in 
cultures of thought, such as the Indic, that experienced a hermeneutic rupture in the 
course of modernity, where we must rethink their native resources in order to 
contribute to an intercultural, global philosophy that is not merely Western philosophy 
gone global. In such cultures of thought, interpreting the ideas of the past becomes 
necessary to establish what might be original and what might bring fresh perspectives 
to the project of thinking globally. The past is therefore critical to the constitution of a 
present philosophy if it is not to be merely presentist. But as many thoughtful 
explorations of the historical materials of the West from a feminist perspective have 
shown,1 we have to be careful to foreground our distinctly contemporary reading of 
these complex materials rather than read into their historical context ideas that are not 
the primary concern of those materials themselves. 
I will begin by outlining the theological context in which we find the poetry of 
two related figures in a Hindu tradition. I will then pose some framing questions 
arising from contemporary feminist discussions about gender and self-representation, 
for example from those like Judith Butler. In the second part of the essay, I will 
explore some of the work of these two devotional poets, Nammāḻvār and Ānṭāl, and 
from that try and tease out implications for contemporary ideas on gender from their 
very different, literary-historical milieu, one that contributes modes of conceiving of 
gender to a contemporary debate shaped almost entirely through the ideas of the 
modern West. 
 
Two Lovers of God 
The distinctive genre of intensely emotional writing on the love of God––bhakti, the 
togetherness wrought by devotion––spreads into most languages and regions of India 
over a period of a thousand years, but it is generally identified as having begun in the 
Tamil country around the sixth to seventh century. In Tamil, it crystallizes around two 
conceptions of the personal God, Śiva and Viṣṇu; I shall look at two key figures who 
belonged and contributed to the constitution of a community of worship around the 
latter. This community, due to its later, distinctive theological conception of the 
divine as Viṣṇu-with-his-consort Śrī (or Lakṣmī), is called Śrīvaiṣṇavism and traces 
its originary sacred material to the compositions attributed to twelve figures––the 
Āḻvārs––who are dated by historical scholarship to between the seventh and tenth 
century. 
I compare here some words of two of these Āḻvārs2 who have remained major 
figures even in the contemporary reading practices and temple rituals of the 
community, Nammāḻvār and Ānṭāl. Ānṭāl––“the Lady who Rules [the Lord, but also 
the devotees of the Lord]”––has always been represented as a woman and writes of 
herself as Koṭai––“daughter of Viṣṇucittan”––which the tradition explains as her 
being the adoptive daughter of the Āḻvār Periyāḻvār. It must be noted that the complex 
process by which the corpus of the Āḻvārs was canonized3 elides independent 
evidence for who they really were historically. There are, of course, other reasons 
why we may agree with David Shulman’s wry remark that the speaker of the poems is 
“Ānṭāl herself, or an assumed persona––it hardly matters” (2016: 118). Nammāḻvār is 
perhaps the most significant of the Āḻvārs, given the centrality of his compositions to 
the sacred corpus. In several poems that are celebrated by the community to this day, 
he writes in the ancient Tamil voice of “the young woman,”4 in the symbolic context 
of akattiṇai, the modes of the akam, or so-called “inner” genre of love in Caṇkam 
Tamil poetry (see Hardy 1983: 354, 364). I suggest that we think of the two categories 
of akam and puram as “inward” and “outward” rather than “inner” and “outer.” The 
distinction is not metaphysical; rather, it pertains to the intentional direction of the 
emotions expressed in each genre––the former toward love and longing, the latter 
toward war and social norms, with frequent mingling of metaphors, sexual desire, and 
martial prowess, for example.5 One might even think of them as a possible framing of 
the private/public distinction. 
The poet-saints write passionately about missing their beloved Lord, including 
in terms that are both erotic in mood and occasionally sensuous in their specificity—
drawing on the tropes of Caṇkam compositions and on the persona of the heroine 
(talaivi) but also moving sharply away from its conventions, in naming the unnamed 
hero, by naming their God as their hero, and in never having the hero speak.6 Their 
revised theopoetics lead us to reflect on the hermeneutic of gendered self-expression. 
Gender and Bodiliness: Reconciling Meaning and Performativity 
Let me begin with the tension that has informed critical feminist thought between (1) 
the apparently pregiven and hence “naturalized” intuitions about the norms for what 
counts as men and women and (2) the instability of the concepts that inform those 
intuitions, once they are subject to analysis. 8 This, of course, has taken the form of 
the discussion over “sex versus gender.” 
In the 1960s and 1970s, feminists sought to use the distinction between 
biological features and expectations about conduct or capacity to challenge the notion 
that biology determines what men and woman can do and who, consequently, they 
are. Kate Millet (1979: 29), for example, articulated the point that gender is 
“overwhelmingly cultural,” pointing to how aggression in boys is not some inbuilt 
biological orientation but a pattern of behavior that is encouraged by society. But this 
idea of using the sex/gender distinction for feminist purposes was subsequently 
challenged because it was argued that “sex” does not come free of interpretation since 
it is already loaded with and coded by the very gender norms that feminists want to 
challenge. However, there is a continued line of thought that maintains that the 
sex/gender distinction is an analytic one that allows us to think more carefully and 
precisely about the concepts that inform the relationship between people.9 
One key aspect of the retention of the sex/gender distinction is that it is 
analytic––it merely draws attention to such things as the cluster of sex properties that 
do play a role in medical health, for example, and also engages with ordinary 
language practices that need to be made sense of and not discarded altogether at the 
cost of radical unintelligibility. That is to say, retention of this distinction is not a 
commitment to an existential difference between what persons experience as being 
about their sex and as being about their gender. It is not that one recognizes size as a 
bare fact and then separately decides whether “size matters” or not, for meaning 
(whatever its implications) is already there in the adult’s noticing of oneself or 
another. At the same time, it is not as if it is impossible to have a physical 
measurement of body parts as such. It is the same with “race.” On the one hand, we 
cannot deny that people have skin or hair of different colors, but that is not noticed 
independently of what being that person of color means in any context (including in 
the company of the mirror alone). Compare acceptance of this analytic link with the 
existential one in biological determinism, the latter of which might hold that having a 
vagina simply is indicative of being “hysterical” or “less able to work successfully at 
large software companies.” 
What is notable about the consequence of understanding sex and gender 
analytically but not existentially is that it permits us to look at the human being whole. 
Although disagreeing on its implications, many feminists have sought to move around 
the tension between sex and gender by talking about the “lived body”––that is, bodily 
subjectivity (what I call here “bodiliness”) as always already suffused with meaning 
from the time reflexivity dawns on the subject. At the same time, this meaning can 
also be seen as capable of being reworked creatively. To take an example of a 
feminist philosopher of the lived body, Toril Moi has eloquently argued for the need 
to describe the meaning that one finds in such bodiliness through phenomenology.10 
The meaning found in reflexive attention to the structures of one’s experience 
is nevertheless not fixed. By the time a person seeks to find meaning in her experience 
of herself in her environment, she already finds herself with a repertoire of concepts––
ideas, expectations, patterns of conduct directed at her, and so on––which are an 
ineliminable part of her capacity for self-understanding. But not only does this 
repertoire change through the life course, many of the changes are wrought by her 
creative agency as much as circumstances. There is a constant percolation of 
meaning-making of experience and selfhood between what one finds oneself already 
to be and what one finds oneself becoming through events and effort.11 In short, 
phenomenology is not an abstract determination of subjectivity but the constant 
re/location of that subjectivity in an ecology of action, emotion, affect, and 
interaction. This “ecological” reading of phenomenology comes most naturally out of 
a consideration of classical Indian materials that have a very different orientation to 
questions of subject, body, identity, gender, and experience than the modern West.12 
Within such an approach, I suggest that we can still benefit from Judith 
Butler’s application of the philosophical concept of “performativity” to gender, 
although clearly I am not following her here into her larger theory that all statements 
about sex are nothing other than gender norms.13 As Butler puts it, 
Acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but 
produce this on the surface of the body ... Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally 
construed, are performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they 
otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through 
corporeal signs and other discursive means. That the gendered body is performative 
suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute 
its reality. (1990a: 186) 
To state my position bluntly: it is insightful to argue that people constantly act 
themselves into being in a variety of ways––in speech, gesture, expressions, 
comportment, clothing, ritual, projection, and reception of the erotic, short-term 
conduct and longer-term self-narratives. These actions are in constant interaction with 
whom they are given to themselves and take themselves to be from the dawn of self-
consciousness. To recognize how what is given/taken configures people is humane; to 
acknowledge that people seek creative agency to reconfigure themselves is a profound 
form of hope. Philosophically, the important point is that this is a description of how 
people’s lives work out and an ethical guide to how we must try to work out life. The 
assertion that people have psychological essences—which is the denial of 
performativity—goes beyond that to a mysterious metaphysical claim. But equally, it 
seems as if the Butlerian contention that all of a person’s sense of being is a 
“fabrication” goes beyond observation of oneself and others to a competing 
metaphysical claim. 
Without therefore taking a view on Butler’s fundamental, metaphysical claim 
that gender “is real only to the extent that it is performed” (1990a: 411), we may 
nonetheless accept her point that although people cannot simply ignore gender norms 
in one’s society, we may, as Alison Stone puts it, “reflect critically on our own 
behaviour, to assess and modify it” (2007: 65). This leads Butler to advocate “a 
proliferation of styles of individual bodily behaviour” that is not constrained by 
whether one is supposed to be a “man” or “woman” (Butler 1990a: 65). Despite my 
caution over the radical Butlerian claim, it is worth emphasizing that by no means do I 
want to say that there is an essence, let alone that that is given by “sex.” If we are 
sensitive to how performativity points to the continuous construction of identity, then 
we will spot that “sex” itself comes with conceptual weight, with social meaning. 
Instead, I want only to say that the assignment of meaning to sex properties is a 
characteristic part of what is given/taken at the start of one’s lifelong project of 
performativity. To call someone a man or a woman is an important part of the analytic 
of communication; it is what makes sense (to us and to others) of what we perform 
with or against. What it means to be called thus, it should be clear to our 
anthropological imagination, is acutely conditioned by cultural time and place. 
Now, Butler’s main objective in developing performativity as a means of 
generating genres is to challenge the man-woman binary and what she argues is the 
dominance of the heterosexual matrix. I should acknowledge straightaway that the 
world of the Āḻvārs that my study explores is one that is unquestioningly founded in 
just that binary, as is the case throughout the classical world. I will not engage with 
the objection that Butler’s challenge to the gender binary itself reinscribes it, 
regardless of its worth. Instead, I focus on a perhaps more manageable matter, which 
is how performativity affects both what one expresses as one’s gender and what one 
expresses as the meaning of that gender. To anticipate the course of this chapter, with 
some of Nammāḻvār’s poetry, we see that the conventional givenness of the man-
woman binary is shown to be labile in the performance of emotion, while in Ānṭāl we 
see the exploration of new limits to the givenness of being a woman. 
The notion of performative genres of comportment suggests that it is the 
critical mode by which a person uses creative agency to refashion phenomenology as 
it is already given. The percolation of subjectivity, as in the performance of the 
repertoire of emotions we find in the Āḻvārs, can also be seen as the movement of 
self-experience from what is given to what one does with it.14 
Let me sum up the main points of the somewhat short line I have taken 
through aspects of contemporary feminist philosophy. While rejecting the pernicious 
assumption that sex determines gender, it is possible to retain an analytic distinction 
between sex and gender and point out that sex characteristics are always found laden 
with meaning. Given the constant and inescapable meaning-making of human beings, 
we must respond to the way gender norms have constrained and restricted people by 
seeing human beings whole, in terms of their lived body or bodily subjectivity. It can 
easily become question-begging to talk of the particular human being as masculine or 
feminine, as if normative presuppositions did not already inform our talk. We need to 
understand the lived body as constituting an ecological phenomenology, in which 
there is a continual flow of meaning into and out of experience due to the dynamic 
environment of such subjective responses as emotions. Given that the human being is 
in possession of concepts about herself that include normative requirements of how to 
be herself, there must be––given revisionary ways of dealing with the power of social 
norms––creative, agentive responses to the gendered situation in which that human 
finds herself. Here, I take agency to be expressed in the literary performance of 
gendered emotion, either to question what gender one is or how one takes a gender to 
be. 
We have now created a constellation of concepts with which to turn to a closer 
examination of poems from Nammāḻvār and Ānṭāl. The idea that there are men and 
women is analytically available when making sense of how meaning is found in 
reflexive understanding of selfhood. At the same time, it is never found without 
norms constructed around it. But the constructed nature of these norms suggests that 
there can be creative responses to them, directed at what one takes oneself to be. This 
taking oneself to be is a form of creativity. When looking at the distant past, we are 
perforce required to seek such creativity in the formalized expression of it in literary 
production (and its reception: when we look at our poems, we begin to see how the 
tradition has received them through its own reception of gender). We can point to 
ways in which these traditional texts can contribute to a richer understanding of 
gender, even while recognizing their limitations and lacunae. 
A Bodily Theopoetics 
For anyone working through various bhakti texts, it is surprising to realize how recent 
and provocative it has been in Christian theology to think that the infinite desire for 
God is tied to an irreducible bodily subjectivity. As Rowan Williams had to point out 
as recently as the early 1990s, “For Gregory [of Nyssa] … we could say, there is no 
such thing as the soul in itself; it is always implicated in contingent matter, and even 
its final liberation … depends … upon the deployment and integration of bodiliness 
and animality” (Williams 1992: 244).15 The Āḻvārs in their expression of the love of 
God, by contrast, demonstrate a Tamil sensibility that treats the inner as simply part of 
the topology of lived reality. As a way of indicating this very different configuration 
of selfhood, I will use “bodiliness” precisely not to mean just a material entity with 
which subjectivity can be related in some way but rather as the very way subjectivity 
is expressed, to itself and others. That is to say, “bodiliness” in my usage indicates 
that, from the start, we are dealing with the human whole that is enmeshed and 
constantly reformed within its environment. Such a fluid ecology is manifest in 
Ānṭāl’s expression of longing: 
Cool clouds, water-laden— 
rise high and spread yourself, 
pour down on Vēṇkaṭam, 
home of the one who took the world from the great demon king. 
Tell him, the lord of men, of my terrible love-sickness: 
For he entered me, 
consumed me, 
took my all, 
Like a worm that has entered a wood-apple. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi [NT] 8.6, viṇ nīla 
mēlāppu)16 
Given our previous considerations about the ecological (and therefore bodily) 
nature of phenomenology, we can see how natural it is for the Āḻvārs to formulate 
their theopoetics in terms of intense bodily affect suffused with divine presence and 
emotional richness. While it is true that if we read a particular ontology––of human 
subject located within an objective world––into the dense phenomenology of 
existence, then the rain clouds are a “mere” metaphor for a woman’s torrential 
thoughts of God; the analytic components of our experience––for there is no denial 
that there are clouds and hills and human beings––do not themselves constitute a rigid 
distinction between things and people. They inform what it is to experience, and for 
Ānṭāl here, there is a phenomenological field in which what it is to be her shifts and 
changes with her love of the personal yet pervasive Kṛṣṇa. Her bodiliness ranges over 
her environment, her feelings shape and are shaped by what she knows, senses, 
imagines, relocates, and immerses her sense of self in. In this, she is exemplary of a 
much-valued poetic sensibility most evident in Tamil and “Southern” Sanskrit 
literature, as Steven Hopkins (2004) has shown. 
I would therefore like to say, programmatically, that we must always keep in 
mind this larger picture of what the poet expresses of her body’s ecological livedness. 
But within it, we cannot think of bodily being without its markers and here––in 
particular––gender. The relationship between a sense of transcendence and the 
gendered body is one that has only recently become thematized in contemporary 
Western thought. As Amy Hollywood says, 
The transcendental conditions of subjectivity are bodily ... Whether as sensorially 
experienced or psychically configured, the body is the very site and support of human 
transcendence and subjectivity ... As women take on subjectivity as embodied beings, 
what Irigaray calls the sensible transcendental ... radically reconfigures the conditions 
and possibilities of subjectivity itself. (2002: 189–90) 
This is already the case with the Āḻvārs, for the bodily subjectivity that attends forms 
of bhakti is not only not ignored––it forms the self-evident locus of expression. Fred 
Hardy (1983) long ago talked of Nammāḻvār as “a mystic of the cosmos of the 
senses” (371). We need, therefore, to keep our attention on the role of bodiliness in its 
generality as well as the way bodiliness is keyed to gender. 
Now, bodiliness in the love of God is not always keyed to gender, yet gender 
gradually emerges in the richly detailed expression of emotion that is the key signifier 
of the Āḻvārs’ poetry. I will delineate this emergence by looking at the particular 
salience the notion of “speaking as a young woman” has in the devotional love of 
Kṛṣṇa. 
Emotion and Bracketing Gender 
To reiterate, what characterizes the genre of bhakti poetry is an intensity of emotional 
expression that may not always be keyed to gender. That is to say, the poet-devotees 
often present loving God as something that is not inflected by the gender of the 
devotee even while bodily self-awareness is central to that love. We can see this in the 
case of another celebrated Tamil woman poet-saint, from the Śaiva rather than 
Vaiṣṇava tradition, Kāraikkāl Ammaiyār. Her poems are among the oldest of the 
bhakti writings, dating back to the sixth century in all likelihood. Karen Pechilis 
(2016: 201) has argued eloquently that Karaikkāl Ammaiyār “only obliquely 
thematizes the human body, in contrast to the three major male poet-saints of the 
Tamil Śaiva bhakti tradition.” Although her “devotional subjectivity” is sometimes 
expressed through her body, “the poet chooses not ‘to body’ beyond assuming 
characteristics common to all human bodies” (Pechilis 2016: 203). 
Birth in this body 
enabled me to express 
my overflowing love 
through speech, 
and I reached 
your sacred henna red feet. (Aṟputat Tiruvantāti v. 1) 
Pechilis points out that the poet-saint “describes the intersubjectivity of emotion” in a 
way that “decenters the individuality of the body” (2016: 204). That is to say, while 
emotions are inescapably expressive of bodily presence, she strives to express them as 
what anybody could express. 
At the same time, the poet-saint implicitly expresses the fact that even the 
emotion she expresses for the sake of all (devotees of Śiva) nevertheless arises from 
what she has made of herself. The hagiographies have it that she was a beautiful, 
married woman but already devout. When her errant husband returned to her only to 
fall at her feet in respect, she asked Śiva to rid her of her beauty and make her ghoul-
like so that she might wander the world singing his praise without drawing the male 
gaze upon her. This narrative doubtless takes its inspiration from such words as in her 
signature verse in another composition, which refers to the fearsome location of one 
of Śiva’s dances: “The ghoul, Kāraikkāl of the blazing mouth and teeth, thrives at this 
burning ground” (Tiruvālaṅāṭṭut Tiruppatikam 2. v. 11). Karen Pechilis argues that 
her use of the third person may provide a protective distance from the controversy of 
training a detailed descriptive gaze on a body that is human, female, and her own. 
But the larger point is that Kāraikkāl Ammaiyār does not train a descriptive gaze on 
her own body in her poetic corpus; she speaks generally of the human body as that 
which allows the experience of both painful afflictions and sublime love. (Pechilis 
2016: 209–10) 
As we will see, by contrast, Ānṭāl offers exactly a “detailed descriptive gaze 
on a body that is human, female, and her own” and yet with the same emotional focus 
on her beloved God. So, we are likely to be persuaded by Pechilis’s argument that the 
reason why Karaikkāl Ammaiyār deflects attention from her bodily intensity of 
devotion is because she wants her emotional expression to be available 
intersubjectively for other devotees regardless of gender. Nevertheless, I want to draw 
attention here to how––especially in light of the hagiographic narrative’s exegesis of 
her words––she has performed a shift––through literal, miraculous bodily 
reconfiguration––in how her gender is to be interpreted. For, notoriously, the human 
norms of the gender binary are suspended when it comes to ghouls, even more so of 
those that then invert their liminality by centering themselves on the presence of God. 
So, she makes herself a ghoul, observes the ghoul, and has the ghoul’s vivid and very 
particular bodily self-expression speak nonetheless for the intensity of devotion quite 
generally. 
Nammāḻvār, being given as a man, does not seem to require a comparably 
elaborate performance of reconfiguration, of blurring the meaning of gender and then 
coming to speak for all devotees (although we will later see that he too has his own 
performance of crossing back and forth). He can often express intense love of God 
that is not keyed to gender, even while suggesting an erotic intensity. For who, in 
feeling that way about God, would think there to be a gender that did not permit 
mingling with the lover? 
In truth he mingled with me. 
Mingling with my spirit, 
the Lord took it as well. (Tiruvāymoḻi 1.8.5–6)17 
In short, while bhakti is an expression of sensible transcendence and is richly bodied 
in its language, it is not always a performance of gender, even if the deflection of 
gendered language requires a complex reconfiguration on the part of the (woman) 
poet. Having acknowledged this, we can turn to increasingly precise ways in which 
the performance of devotional emotion can be revealed as gendered in thought-
provoking ways. 
Engendering Emotion within Norms of Perspective 
In the Tiruppāvai, the poet writes primarily in the first-person plural of a group of 
questing cowherd girls (gopīs) as they wake up and prepare to find their way to the 
house of their beloved Lord, where he is asleep with his Tamiḻ consort, Nappiṉṉai. 
Sometimes, a group of them address one of their friends, who has not woken up yet. 
Very occasionally, the poet’s perspective implicitly looks upon the group from the 
outside. The commentarial tradition interprets this as Ānṭāl locating herself as one of 
the gopīs. This often-choral voice of women, expressing a sometimes demanding but 
always well-mannered and respectful love and longing for their beloved God, is 
received by the tradition as speaking for all devotees. To this day, it is recited by men 
as well as women, quite generally, even though it is clearly keyed by gender.18 
Worshippers today, men and women, take on the persona of the gopī and read that as 
taking on Ānṭāl’s persona as a gopī so that a man may sing as a woman singing as 
another woman. 
It would be a different undertaking to trace the reception, history, and 
contemporary dynamics of Ānṭāl’s figuration in the liturgical imagination of 
Śrīvaiṣṇava men. The (after) life of a gendered text may have its own implications for 
performativity, for the situation with the Tiruppāvai’s reception is more than a little 
unusual in religious history. For this essay, however, I only want to draw attention to 
the fact that the issue of gendered performance may lie not only within the textual 
expressivity of the poet but also in its reception by the community (of liturgical rather 
than merely literary readers). It is an open question as to what exactly happens in the 
liturgical rendition of Ānṭāl, for it is not merely acting when it comes to the existential 
tug of devotion. At the least, we can say that the taking on of the persona of a poet-
saint-goddess for profound spiritual activity does something to conceptions of 
masculinity, even if it does not make for the shifting of gender binaries. 
Returning, then, to what is given within text, this sense that performance is not 
about a shift in gendered selfhood but a taking on (for howsoever profound a 
motivation) of a persona is conveyed well in the artful experimentation of another 
Āḻvār, Tirumankai.19 The tradition itself recognizes this: the hagiography has him 
chasing after women before his transformation.20 As Archana Venkatesan has said, he 
is thought of as the “poet’s poet,” who “experiments with genres, metres and poetic 
situations” and uses “poetic virtuosity” in “molding his women (talaivis) and their 
maddening predicament” of loving a God who is absent (Venkatesan 2007a: 19). I 
mention Tirumankai only in order to clarify that not all poetic voices are equally 
existential in the import of their performance of gender. But we have to be cautious 
about drawing any hard and fast lines between “mere” persona and something more 
transfigurative. Depending on our criteria, we may read the implications of these 
theopoetic voices differently. 
From a literary perspective, Venkatesan offers this reading: 
In contrast to Andal, our two male poets, Tirumankai and Nammāḻvār, do not 
juxtapose the material and mythic worlds … Rather, they employ the full 
complement of female characters of the akam genre to construct and comment on the 
interior world of their talaivi [heroine]. (2007a: 21) 
This might indicate that, if we use as criterion the choice of literary topoi––which 
offers one perspective on the ecology of the poet’s phenomenology––we can find a 
difference in expressiveness between those we already take to be the male poets and 
their female counterpart.21 
If we shift our attention to the dimensions of emotional expression in that 
bodily intense way that characterizes many of Nammāḻvār’s composition, and 
suspend the presupposition of what it means to say that he is a male poet, other 
aspects of his poetry come to the fore. So, let us look at Nammāḻvār’s expression of 
love as a woman for the male God and ask if the surface differences in literary tropes 
that Venkatesan points out overlie a deeper similarity with Ānṭāl. Here, the distinction 
between persona and character, between literary style and existential performativity, 
is blurred. For example, consider these verses: 
I had not consented, but He came and consumed my life, 
Day after day He came and consumed me 
altogether. 
Except for serving my Lord in southern 
Kātkarai with its dark rain clouds 
Is there anything else that my dear life 
could enjoy? (Tiruvāymoḻi 9.5.8)22 
… The disease of my desire climaxes, deep 
going, melting in a torrent. 
It seemed He would just rule over me, 
But instead He consumed my life, that 
amazing one, and 
Just a little is left after He consumed my 
dear life. 
I had not consented, but He came and 
consumed my life. (Tiruvāymoḻi 9.6.7–8) 
… He is my Lord Krishna, 
And to Him I have surrendered my 
womanhood. 
So what’s the use of getting angry, women? (Tiruvāymoḻi 7.3.5) 
Nammāḻvār does appear to juxtapose the mythic and the local (the reference is to the 
temple in Thirukatkarai, near present-day Eranakulam, Kerala). But the important 
point is that, in doing so, he expresses here an urgency of emotion that goes beyond 
the literary donning of a persona––instead entering into––performing––a gendered 
genre of being. The woman’s voice here follows cultural and literary norms, and we 
are not to overstate the case and think that nonbinary genders are being imagined into 
being. Nonetheless, at this point, in this way, Nammāḻvār is performing the 
conception of womanhood available to him, not as literary ventriloquism but as 
existential reconfiguration of the phenomenology of bhakti. The poet here feels in a 
way that can, necessarily, only be articulated through his conceptual repertoire––but 
there is more to it than mimesis. 
Here we need to find a fine balance. When we are exploring what it might 
mean to understand a classical Indian reworking of gender, we cannot afford to help 
ourselves to the sexual identity of the poet, as if the culturally given category closes 
off the agency to perform outside of that identity. We learn nothing about the 
phenomenology of gender if we say that here is a man writing “as” a woman and 
leave it at that. But neither can we afford to lose our footing in the culturally given 
identity altogether, for then it makes no sense at all to say that the young woman’s 
voice here is Nammāḻvār’s. We will be left with no purchase on the thought that 
gender can be performed, if we do not start with how performers construe their own 
bodily self-presence while essaying their performance. 
This is why I want to say that here a man is performing womanhood. By 
which I mean to say that we should try to neither conflate sex and gender nor 
ontologize a difference. We can gain a sense of what is expressively similar in the 
performance of gender if we compare Nammāḻvār with Ānṭāl, even as the comparison 
can function hermeneutically only through the terms of thinking of the former’s 
verses as a reconfiguration and the latter’s as a figuration of certain (theopoetically 
transformed) norms of “womanhood.” So let us consider Ānṭāl’s invocation of 
“womanhood” (peṇmai). 
My tears gather and spill between my breasts 
like waterfalls. 
He has destroyed my womanhood. 
How does this bring him pride? (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi 8.1, viṇ nīla mēlāppu) 
Similar too is the invocation of the familiar Tamil tropes of being entered, of being 
consumed, of being tortured––all of it secret or a secret that, once proclaimed, has the 
added force of revelation. 
My clever and perfect lord 
whose mighty arms easily wield the śārṅga bow 
between him and me 
a secret has passed 
that only he and I know. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi [Maṉṉu perum pukaḻ Mātavan] 5.8) 
I confess I find it mostly difficult to say how the emotional presentation is 
different in the two cases. But because of the inescapable knowledge that the latter 
examples are from Ānṭāl, it seems as if she is impatient of her fate, more ready to 
quarrel with her beloved, prepared to complain rather than endure. Perhaps here, we 
see traces of the aetiology of Nammāḻvār’s imagination of himself into womanhood––
namely, his normative understanding of what it is to become woman––whereas Ānṭāl 
just is, and we need to follow her into an understanding of whatever it is to be woman 
because she says so. (Better to be hesitant here about drawing hard and fast 
conclusions about one’s own suppositions about gender.) Once we are made sensitive 
to her readiness to be herself rather than an idea of herself, we see that violent 
intensity that is as far away as one could get from a demure rendition of masculinist 
norms of being “woman.” 
My perfect lord 
who holds the spotless white conch in his left hand 
refuses to reveal himself to me. 
Instead he enters me, tortures me all day, 
toys with my life, 
and leads me a merry dance. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi [Maṉṉu perum pukaḻ Mātavan] 5.2) 
In between: A Note on Nammāḻvār’s Gender Crossings 
If we are to press on and ask if there is any noncircular way of asking how 
Nammāḻvār and Ānṭāl express womanhood, we should look more carefully at the role 
of body morphology in their language, for the greatest trouble for reading around the 
gender/sex problem is the idea of sex-specific properties. But before that, it is worth 
looking at a particularly provocative yet much celebrated poem of Nammāḻvār’s. I 
think it shows that performance works on many levels of signification at the same 
time, and to be comfortable rather than uncomfortable with the changes implied by 
performance is an important requirement for those who would wish to be sensitive to 
gender play in devotional love. These are the two relevant verses from the poem: 
Lifting my modesty, stealing my heart, 
The Lord of the deities reaches the highest heavens. 
I swear, my friend! 
I shall shock all the earth, 
Do weird things—ride the palmyra stem like a horse. 
With no sense of shame, I shall ride 
the palmyra stem through every street in town, 
and women from all the lands will cheer me on. 
And I shall demand from the Lord 
a cool blossom from the tuḻai plant 
and adorn my head with it. (Tiruvāymoḻi 5.3.9–10)23 
The reference is to the practice of maṭal ūrtal, a version of which is traceable to the 
Caṇkam literature and which is performed in some parts of the Tamil country to this 
day. In it, a man who has been spurned by a woman sits in acute discomfort on the 
sharp fronds of a palmyra stem and pretends to ride it like a horse around town, 
declaiming his love for her. His public humiliation shows the depth of his love and is 
meant to convince her to agree to his suit in order to stop the display. 
As can be seen straightaway, here Nammāḻvār writes as a woman who 
threatens to act as a man and that in a spectacularly mortifying way.24 Is it a return to 
his self-understanding as a man, or is it a further move from imagining how a woman 
may think it properly provocative to be “weird” in order to draw God’s attention? And 
let us think too: if the ritual is for a man to force a woman to put him out of his 
misery, does the woman performing as a man––through an act forbidden for 
women—imply that the beloved is a man or a woman (given the expectation that 
heterosexual norms apply)? Here we see how heteronormativity and the gender binary 
themselves become a powerful frame for performative engendering of emotion. 
This particular passage from Nammāḻvār should make us think carefully of the 
existential force of performativity, especially when it is for the sake of divine love, 
understood in bhakti as the very furthest a human being can go in meaningful 
emotion. 
Morphology and the Performance of Gendered Emotion 
It is true that, apart from a very few instances of invoking symbolic tropes from 
akattinam, Nammāḻvār does not offer a morphologically keyed view of the woman 
devotee in a way that might be seen as merely reducing gender to biological sex. 
Nammāḻvār does use the emotional registers and, of course, the psychogeography of 
the symbolic Tamil landscape. But when it comes to writing as the young woman, his 
imaginative location is only occasionally––if tellingly––reliant on bodily morphology 
and much more on these other markers of his sensorium. So, we are made sensitive to 
the construction of gender within the context of what the tradition takes to be the 
givenness of his male body. 
This is no compassion, no compassion 
at all, Kṛṣṇa. 
Every time You touch my full breasts 
There swells inside me a vast flood of joy 
That crests not even in heaven, it surrounds 
and submerges all I know— 
And yet it ends like a dream. 
Desire reaches deep deep inside me— 
but, alas, not that a life can bear, 
oh! 
Yet separating from You right now is still 
worse, 
When You go out to herd the cows: 
It is my ruin. (Tiruvāymoḻi 10.3.2) 
Our life like wax melting away in fire, 
Our bright bracelets and cloth slack and 
slipping down, 
Tears like pearls trickle from our flower 
eyes, our breasts are pale, shoulders 
frail. (Tiruvāymoḻi 10.3.7) 
Intense love courses through the entirety of the Āḻvār’s phenomenology. What is 
shown here is not a universal mode of devotion to God but the particularity of feeling 
lovelorn, the whole of oneself brought into an emotional state that is naturally 
described by the available resources of one’s cultural repertoire. By now, surely, it 
seems otiose even for the critic––let alone the devotee––to seek judgment of whether 
a man has imagined what it would be like to feel something in breasts that he does not 
have or whether there is just a field of complex, gendered subjectivity within which 
the poetic voice has found itself. 
The particular use of bodily materiality to express lovelorn (virāha) devotion 
in Ānṭāl too is accompanied by the symbolic tropes of Caṇkam poetry. She too 
deploys the symbols of that cultural repertoire. So, for example, in the famous 
opening song of the Nācciyār Tirumoḻi, she says, 
O, Ancient God of Love 
I painted your name upon the wall— 
the black sugarcane bow, the banner bearing the shark, the horses, 
and the maidens with their fly-whisks. 
Have you even noticed? 
From childhood 
I adored the Lord of Dvaraka, 
Pledged my swelling breasts to him. Quickly. 
Unite me with him. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi [tai oru tiṇkaḷ] 1.4) 
The intense love is communicated through sensual experience of the body. Fred 
Hardy says in this regard, 
One only has to look … at the recurring references to her breasts, to realise how 
much she is a person “of flesh and blood,” how strongly aware she is of, and accepts 
positively, her physical nature. No other Āḻvār is so definite about it. … Though I 
think it is legitimate to regard many songs of Ānṭāl as personal expressions, as 
belonging to the level of mysticism, we must not overlook the close similarities to the 
symbolic language typical of the girl poems. In other words, even when Ānṭāl speaks 
directly about her personal emotions, she does it by resorting to certain typical 
symbols: her breasts and her abdomen. (Hardy 1983: 427–8) 
But by now, we know that it cannot be the mere occurrence of these material symbols 
of a whole-body phenomenology of love that marks the song of the “woman” (or 
“girl,” as Hardy has it in the language of a generation ago). Yet it is not entirely out of 
our aesthetic reach to focus on the poetry while bracketing the poet and ask if perhaps 
in Ānṭāl there is a morphological frankness that is peculiarly hers, which is evident in 
her plea. 
Tormented by that Hṛṣikeśa 
who is exalted by the gods of every direction 
I lost the luster of my pearly white smile 
the redness of my full lips, 
and my young breasts surrendered their beauty. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi [Maṉṉu perum 
pukaḻ Mātavan] 5.6) 
That frankness is not just the way she returns to gendered symbols but how specific, 
how frankly aware of the mirror, they appear in the poetry. And it is not just the 
appearance but other modes of her sensorium. 
Are they fragrant as camphor? Are they fragrant as the lotus? 
Or do those coral lips taste sweet? 
I ache to know the taste, the fragrance of the lips 
of Mādhava, who broke the tusk of the elephant. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi [Karuppūram 
Nāṟumō] 7.1) 
Here, the freshness and immediacy of her language seems less focused on gendering 
performance and more a recreation of the significance of a gender she takes as given. 
Of course, there is nothing sensorily “bare” about the “given,” for as soon as any of us 
speaks of how we feel and what we take our emotions to be, we cannot but take 
recourse in the lexicon available to us. And, Ānṭāl is a poet of skill and sophistication 
who is totally in command of her literary inheritance. But what I think is that the 
primary lesson about gender we get here is that creative agency in Ānṭāl is about 
asserting what the person who takes herself as woman may tell of her emotions rather 
than about asserting that she is a woman as her culture would have it. Perhaps it is 
only in Nammāḻvār’s desperate threat to behave like a lovesick man that we find in 
him this challenge to what a woman may be in classical Tamil culture. 
Ānṭāl, Erotic Theopoetics, and Writing “as” a Woman 
We have now found our way through how there is a subtle relationship between a 
given/taken gender that turns on assumptions about sex identity and the performative 
nature of gender (as found in the textual expression of theopeotics). On the one hand, 
if we trace all our literary and existential responses to the nature of the poetry back to 
a simple assumption of which poet is a man and which one is a woman, then we lose 
sight of the significance of how gender is performed in these works. On the other 
hand, both the literary skill and the existential urgency of performing gender make 
little sense if we do not set the poetry against the background of the cultural 
knowledge of who is given/taken as whom (here, in the hagiographies of the poet-
saints). 
With that balance in mind, we should also be aware that the salience of 
gendered performance might vary, and we notice that within and outside the poetic 
compositions. Inside the poem, we see the literary qualities that may distinguish as 
well as unite Nammāḻvār and Ānṭāl, while outside it, we may ask similarly about what 
it means that both write “as” young women in love with a personal male God. Not just 
in the cultured expression of raw emotion but also in the use of symbolic tropes, many 
things unite the two Āḻvārs. But Ānṭāl has what I call a “morphological frankness” in 
her Nācciyār Tirumoḻi that is unparalleled. I suggest that this is because she is 
“starting” with a gendered identity she does not consist, and therefore her creative 
agency is directed toward exploring how that identity may be expressed against the 
limits of cultural norms. This is important. When we talk about what it is to be 
gendered, we should also mean how we should so. With this consideration in mind, I 
will finish my study of Ānṭāl’s work with a look at how the erotic dimension of her 
theopoetics points to the subversive nature of her interpretation of her gender. 
We should, of course, recognize the literary relationship of dependence 
between her employment of, on the one hand, the older akam topoi that hold between 
people and, on the other, her new mythopoetic reformulation of them in her 
relationship with God. But we should not therefore take the eros of the latter as an 
emotional derivative of the former. Too often, we take “the erotic” to be first a 
relationship understood between humans that only subsequently gets theologized as a 
model of a relationship with God. We should not take the desire for God as something 
parasitic on a secular reality but, instead, as a fundamental expression of eros. When 
Ānṭāl talks of being married to no man, it is not like, say, her preferring King Ranga 
to Priest Śekhara but rather a distinction between two orders of being. 
She cries out: 
Lord of Desire! My ripening breasts swell 
For that Lord who holds the conch and flaming discus 
I could not live, 
If there is even mention of offering my body to men. 
That would be as terrible as a forest-roaming jackal coming in 
and sniffing the offering, 
That the learned Brahmins who uphold the Vedas, 
Have given up to the gods in heaven. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi [tai oru tiṇkaḷ] 1.7) 
Notice the elegant simplicity with which the completely conventional trope of 
maidenly modesty in front of the male (human) gaze is startlingly inverted by the 
claim of arousal––that is to say, the yearning to gaze toward the face of the absent 
God, the God who will not look at her. Here, the very performance of her given/taken 
gender is an assertion of its changed (albeit theopoetic) meaning. So, we see that 
creative performance is about what it means to be gendered as much as what it means 
to engender oneself. 
My breasts seek the gaze of the one 
whose beautiful hand lifts the discus. 
Bound tightly in a red cloth, their eyes 
shy away from the gaze of mere mortals 
desiring none other than Govinda. 
I cannot live here a moment longer 
Please take me to the shore of the Yamunā. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi 12.4) 
Learning from the Tradition 
Despite this way of thinking about the erotic and gender, we still have a fundamental 
question: if we are to guard ourselves against the essentialism of taking gender to be 
what is always and already given/taken even as self-consciousness dawns on the 
individual with the emergence of personhood, what do we do about the intuition 
within community and academy that we have here the writings of older-man-as-
young-woman and young-woman-as-young woman? I think an answer that imputes a 
wholesale false consciousness, in which everyone is trapped in ignorance of gender 
construction, is not only morally bleak but also epistemologically unviable. So, we 
must ask what is going on in the reception of Ānṭāl as herself, the one woman among 
the Āḻvārs and thus “the lady who rules.” Of course, there are the purely poetic 
characteristics of Ānṭāl: the unwavering first personalism, the blending of the mythic 
into the personal, the weight of repeated focusing on bodily morphology, and the 
community’s own recognition of her use of sexual relationality: as it is clear in 
Periyavāccāṉ Piḷḷai’s medieval commentary, there is a straightforward acceptance of 
her use of sexual metaphors.25 Her assured frankness and intimate detail takes many 
forms. This may be in tenderness: 
The master of the cowherds, 
tends his calves, staff in hand. 
He danced too with the waterpots in sacred Kuṭantai. 
Bring me the cool blue basil leaf 
And place it on my soft, tangled curls. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi [Kaṇṇaṉ eṉṉum] 13. 2) 
Or it may be in agonistic ferocity that skillfully evokes and radically reworks the 
imagery of the Caṇkam heroine Kaṇṇaki (who, upon hearing of the unfair execution 
of her unfaithful husband by the king, in fury tore off her breast and flung it at his 
city, and set it afire): 
I melt, anguished. 
But he does not care if I live or die. 
If I see that thief, 
that looting lord of Govardhana, 
I shall pluck these useless breasts of mine 
from their roots, 
Will fling them at his chest, 
And stop that raging fire in me. (Nācciyār Tirumoḻi 13. 8) 
The trouble I have been talking about is the impossibility of disentangling intuitions 
about the given/taken nature of gender from performative re/construction of it, even 
when we know that gendered power is encoded in that givenness. But let us think of 
the significance the tradition attaches to the conflation of the devotee’s poetic “I” and 
the personal “I” in Ānṭāl, simply by virtue of treating the author of the Tiruppāvai and 
the Nācciyār Tirumoḻi “as” a woman. The tradition and scholarship tends to think that 
because she is a woman, she writes in a particular way that men do not. (As per Fred 
Hardy, mystical ecstasy for Nammāḻvār, “in the girl and gopī songs” is “clearly 
connected with eroticism. Ānṭāl, who was herself a girl, was uniquely able to integrate 
the erotic and the mystical planes” [1983: 369]). This makes sense when we hold 
normative gender identities for granted and ask only about literary representation and 
think of such poems as talk about women as––in Martha Selby’s words––
“representations of male attempts to aesthetically capture and portray female 
sexuality” (Selby 2000: 104). But from the perspective of this essay and its concern 
about the question of how gender is re/constructed, this can seem circular as a general 
statement. Obviously, if there is a context that invites the reader to see the stylized, 
literary expression as a self-conscious replication of a different gendered perspective–
–as in the case of Tirumankai, whose coming to devotion includes an extravagantly 
heterosexual male identity, as a man who used to chase women––then it is fair enough 
to accept the poet’s word. But absent such a context––and in the case of Nammāḻvār, 
there is no second-order hagiographic guidance apart from the giveness of an identity 
as a man––then we must let the poetic voice that emerges in the text to remain 
immersed in its gendered performance. 
Instead, we should see––through looking at how the tradition takes it that this 
is a woman while Nammāḻvār is a man––that the imaginative gender location in 
theopoetics (at least) is on a continuum between different modes of gender 
construction: from where the person strives agentively to express identity, all the way 
to where some self-formation has always already been there, especially through a 
morphology that is used in different and fluid cultural contexts to affirm a view of 
one’s gender. We have to make sense of our intuition that we can talk of a man 
writing as a woman and a woman writing as a woman, but we must understand that 
this is inescapably circular; for what we are looking at is how a human being is being 
gendered, always already and yet also by choice. We can neither start with a contrast 
between the given and the constructed nor can we claim to see a pure act of 
construction with nothing given left over. 
So, we must see the use of morphological characteristics as lying at the point 
where always already given constructions are taken up and used in creative agency, 
not always of “a gender” but what it might mean in the ecology of one’s experience of 
being oneself. In our contemporary theoretical concern to deconstruct all sense of the 
given, we tend to ignore the challenge of having to account for the creative bearing 
that materiality has for our gendered selves. There are powerful reasons why bodily 
morphology can be the ground of the “first construction,” whose primacy lies in its 
appeal to an apparent essence. I want to suggest that the contemporary significance of 
Ānṭāl lies in her being taken as a woman who speaks of love of God but with a voice 
resembling that of a man whose work she must have known, a voice, moreover, 
already heard in a preexisting literary sensibility. 
The reception by the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition of her as a woman of authority, 
appeal, and a virtually unsurpassed relevance to this day shows that even if self-
expressions of essence are fundamentally constructed, that emotional power and 
poetic teleology can evoke in others the possibility of their own narratives through a 
theoaesthetics of gender: “The passion of Ānṭāl and the surrender of Nammāḻvār are 
the passion and surrender of the devotee” (Narayanan 1987: 150). But, in these subtle 
ways, sometimes reflexive and at others lost in the sheer force of devotional 
belonging, the passion and surrender are also gendered and inflect what it means to be 
gendered when participating in the Śrīvaiṣṇava liturgy. And that participation, I want 
to say, is a magnifying lens through which to look at more general existential 
conditions by which representation feed into the gendering of emotion. The 
theopoetics we have been engaging with is not only of esoteric value to a community 
of worshippers; it is indicative of questions of the most fundamental import to lives 
with very different teleologies. 
It may be possible, if one is sensitive to the range of human expression, to 
look for lessons as much in Ānṭāl as in Gregory of Nyssa, as much in theopoetics as 
street theatre, as much in classical Tamiḻ as in Spanish, as much in religion as in 
cinema. But with it comes the responsibility of recognizing the lacunae in one’s 
material. I therefore want to be careful not to overstate the case. To reiterate, this 
exploration has not got us to looking critically at the gender binary and 
heteronormativity or at structures of power in language, class/caste, and institutions. 
Yet it would not be becoming of a student of these Āḻvārs to be too modest about their 
significance. In their theology, in their poetic power, in the continued if overlooked 
liturgical significance, they do make us think about how gender may be negotiated 
between what is given/taken and performed, how boundaries may be acknowledged 
only to be crossed, and norms symbolically deployed only to reconfigure their 
meaning. There is still much to be done in thinking through issues of gender through 
the classical past. 
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1 For example, Lloyd (1984); in a very different mode, Zajko and Leonard (2006). 
2 I set aside here the complex question of Ānṭāl’s identity as more a goddess than an 
Āḻvār in the community; see Hudson (1993). 
3 For an evocative summary of the process, see Shulman (2016: 125–8). 
4 The “heroine” in one of the standard persona of the earliest layers of Tamil poetry 
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23 For this passage, I use the translation from Narayanan (1987: 43–4). 
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